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Summary
The paper reviews the extent to which a decade of analysis and expe-
rience has altered thinking about the choice of an exchange rate system.
The advantages of flexible rates are viewed to have been exaggerated.
They do not permit governments to have permanently higher rates of economic
activity at the expense of higher inflation as some thought. Further,
the slow speed of adjustment to relative price changes limits the contrib-
ution of flexible rates to external adjustment in the short—run, and the
degree of insulation from external influences that they provide. Finally,
flexible rates tend to be fluctuating rates,and, although there is little
empirical evidence so far showing that the fluctuations have had adverse
effects on trade and capital flows, the exchange rate instability more
than any other factor has led to a certain disillusionment with the float-
ing rate system. Notwithstanding the drawbacks of flexible rates, there
will be a continuing need for exchange rate flexibility over the next few
years, and some analysis is given of the problems of achieving greater
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For some time the view has been developing that the flexible rate
system has not accomplished as much as many of its supporters had hoped it
would. More recently, in the discussions associated with theadoption of
the European Monetary System, there has been a renewal of interest in the
advantages and disadvantages of adopting some form of pegging. Itmay be
time, therefore, to review the extent to which a decade of analysis and
experience has altered thinking about the choice of an exchange rate system.
As in the earlier debate, the discussion of fixed and flexible rates in
recent years has been almost exclusively directed to the choice ofexchange
rate systems for developed countries, and the scope of thispaper is simi-
larly limited.
The case for a flexible exchange rate system wasgenerally based on
hopes of what would result, and the case against on fears of whatmight
happen. Part I is directed to a critical analysis of some of the views
widely held by adherents of flexible rates. It is pointed out that few
today would defend flexible rates on the grounds that they permitgovern-
ments to take advantage of a long—term trade—off between employment and
wage increases, and thus make it possible for countries to have permanently
*Theresearch reported here is part of the NEER's researchprogram in
international studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The authors are members of the staff of the International MontaryFund,
but the views presented in this paper are not to be interpretedas neces-
sarily indicating the position of the Executive Board or of the officials
of the Fund.—2—
higher rates of economic activity at the expense of higher inflation. It
is also argued that many adherents of flexible rates gave inadequate weight
to the slow speed of adjustment to relative price changes in the goods
markets. They thus exaggerated the contribution that exchange rate changes
would make in the short run to external adjustment, and similarly over-
estimated the extent to which flexible rates would insulate countries from
external influences and leave them free to pursue domestic objectives
through the use of domestic economic policies.
Part II takes a similarly critical approach to some of the fears
raised by opponents of flexible rates. Some of the concerns are found to
have had sme basis, particularly the fear that flexible rates would tend
to be fluctuating rates, and it is suggested that exchange rates might con-
tinue to show considerable instability even under relatively stable under-
lying economic and financial conditions. There is less empirical evidence
to justify other concerns, namely that flexible rates would have adverse
effects on trade and capital flows, but some of the most marked exchange
rate instability has been too recent to show much effect as yet. Finally,
a brief analysis is given of the complex and mixed relationship between
flexible rates and inflation.
Part III draws together the main conclusions and discusses the search
for greater exchange rate stability. It is pointed out that, notwithstand-
ing the drawbacks of flexible rates, the nature of the conditions likely
to exist in a number of member countries over the next few years will give
rise to a continuing need for a measure of exchange rate flexibility, and
some analysis is given of the problems of achieving the requisite amount of—3—
flexibility under pegged rates. The paper concludes with a brief discussion
of the relationship between monetary policy and exchange rate stability. It
is pointed out that keeping a close eye on external conditions in deter-
mining monetary policy can help in setting limits to short—run exchange rate
instability, and that some national monetary authorities are already giving
greater weight than in the past to existing or potential exchange market
developments.
I. The Case for Flexible Rates
Much of the earlier support for flexible rates was based on the weak-
ness of the pegged rate system, and Milton Friedman's classic article pub-
lished in 1953 promised only modest benefits from the adoption of flexible
rates. In the main, flexible rates were expected to isolate a country from
monetary disturbances originating abroad and to help reconcile countries'
divergent rates of monetary growth. It was also expected that flexible
rates would lead to a smooth working of the external adjustment process
without exchange crises or the need for controls on trade and capital flows.
Many of those who supported flexible rates in the 1960s, however, expected
much more from them. They believed, in particular, that there was a long—
term trade—off between employment and inflation, and saw exchange rate flex-
ibility as an opportunity for individual countries to adopt price—employment
objectives of their own choosing. It was also widely held that flexible
rates would help to achieve stable growth, in particular by providing a
significant measure of insulation from external real as well as monetary
shocks. In the event, the flexible exchange rate system has not accomplished—4—
all that its supporters had hoped, and we consider each of the areas in
which developments have turned out somewhat differently than expected.
A. Flexible Rates and the Trade—off
The case for exchange rate flexibility was initially built on a belief
that various countries cannot for long maintain the same inflation rate
because of the undesirable but unavoidable tendency for governments to
"tamper" with their currencies to various degrees. This was clearly the
view advanced by Friedman (1953):
Governments of "advanced" nations are no longer willing to
submit themselves to the harsh discipline of the gold standard
involving rigid exchange rates. They will evade its discipline
by direct controls over trade if that will suffice and will change
exchange rates before they will surrender control over domestic
monetary policy. Perhaps a few modern inflations will establish
a climate in which such behavior does not qualify as "advanced";
in the meantime we had best recognize the necessity of allowing
exchange rates to adjust to internal policies rather than the
reverse. (p. 180)
Differential inflation rates must inevitably lead to exchange rate adjust-
ments, and flexible exchange rates were seen to provide the least incon-
venient form of adjustment. Flexible rates were not viewed as the "first
best" system, but only as a "second best" system that had to be used
because political realities made the fixed rate system unworkable.
This argument based on political realism was soon, however, to be
accompanied by the view that it would be desirable for countries to be
left free to choose their own inflation rates because there is a long—term
trade—off between inflation and unemployment. The choice of the inflation
rate came to be seen as an important prerogative of a, government, and
flexible exchange rates were going to make it possible for each country—5—
to maintain its optimal inflation rate. This view was apparent, for
example, in Johnson (1969):
On the one hand, a great rift exists between nations like
the United Kingdom and the United States, which are anxious to
maintain high levels of employment and are prepared to pay a
price for it in terms of domestic inflation, and other nations,
notably the West German Federal Republic, which are strongly
adverse to inflation. Under the present fixed—exchange—rate
system, these nations are pitched against each other in a bat-
tle over the rate of inflation that is to prevail in the world
economy... .Flexiblerates would allow each country to pur-
sue the mixture of unemployment and price trend objectives it
prefers, consistent with international equilibrium, equilibrium
being secured by appreciation of the currencies of "price stabil-
ity"countries relative to the currencies of "full employment"
countries.(p. 100)
The notion that countries were faced with a trade—off between infla-
tion and unemployment enjoyed a considerable vogue during the 1960s
following Phillips' article in 1958. A case can be made that the notion
that there was any significant long—run trade—off between inflation and
unemployment was never consistent with well—established generalizations
about economic behavior. This is indicated by the low—key way in which
the original basic criticism of the trade—off was made. Milton Friedman's
initial critique of the long—term trade—off was made as part of a comment
on a paper by Robert Solow. As Friedman (1966) put it in a very matter—of—
fact fashion:
The basic fallacy is to suppose that there is a trade—off between
inflation and employment; that is to suppose that by inflating more
over any long period of time, you can have on the average a lower
level of unemployment ....Byspeeding up the rate of monetary
expansion and aggregate demand you can unquestionably increase out-
put and employment temporarily ...onlyuntil people adjust their
anticipations ...froma logical point of view, the true trade—off
is between unemployment today and unemployment at a later date.
It is not between unemployment and inflation. There is no long—
run stable trade—off between inflation and unemployment. (pp. 58—59.)—6—
Similarly, when Phelps (1972) looked back at his critical analysis of the
long—run trade—off argument he drew attention in a footnote to the fact
that Professors Feilner and Wallich had put forward similar views at Yale
prior to the discovery of the Phil.lips curve, and such reasoning could be
found in the writings of Von Mises in the 1920s and between the lines of
the work of the classical economists.
It is nevertheless easy to see how the trade—off concept caught on
among economists and policymakers. In the first place, it was really a
codification of experience rather than a new idea. In the past, it had
generally been true that periods of recession or depression had been
characterized by reduced wage and price increases, and in the extreme
case by absolute declines. Similarly, periods of prosperity had usually
been associated with higher than average wage and price increases. It was
not surprising, therefore, that plotting wage increases on the vertical
axis and unemployment on the horizontal axis led to a cluster of points
that suggested a curve that was downward sloping to the right. Second,
there appeared to be ample evidence that economies react in this way in
the short run, with the rate of wage increase declining under conditions
of less than full employment and tending to rise during periods of boom.
It was only one step from this to the view that a stable Phillips curve
could be combined with a preference function for a particular society to
derive an optimum choice of unemployment and inflation for an economy.
Since it was assumed that every economy had its own unique Phillips curve
and its own unique set of preferences for inflation and unemployment, it
was not to be expected that countries would choose the same level of wage
and price increases.—7—
As indicated above, the final stage in which the Phillips curve was
used to choose a particular combination of unemployment and inflation over
the long run is the one which might give pause; and it is certainly true
that few were prepared to make this step without qualifications. Some, for
example, recognized that after a time wage earners would start building
expected future price increases into their wage bargains and that any par-
ticular trade—off would not be stable. It was argued, however, that it
would take time for wage earners to adjust to rising prices, and that
employment gaitis could be made today at the expense of higher inflation
and unemployment at some later stage. This kind of "aprs nous le deluge"
thinking served temporarily to maintain a rearguard action, but with the
surge of inflation in the late l960s it became impossible to ignorethe
"not—so—long—run" inflationary effects of trying to raise employment per-
manently by using expansionary monetary or fiscal policies. There would
thus be few today who would argue for flexible exchange rates on the grounds
that they give countries a significant amount of freedom over the long run
to choose a higher level of employment at the expense of more rapid price
increases. The case for flexible rates as a first best system on these
grounds can be dismissed. As will be argued later on in this paper, the
more prosaic case based on political realities cannot be dismissed as easily.
B.Flexible Rates and External Adjustment
Flexible rates were also expected to facilitate greatly the working of
the international adjustment process, in particular among industrial coun-
tries. In the longer run, they would ensure that, at any given level of
economic activity, the supply of and demand for foreign exchange originating—8—
from current account transactions would be consistent with the foreign
investment flows that reflect longer—run differences in propensities to
save and in investment opportunities among countries. In the short run,
flexible rates would ensure that financing flows would be available to
offset any short—run excess demand for, or supply of, foreign exchange
originating from current account transactions and longer—run foreign
investment flows without unduly large variations in the exchange rate.
Demand—management policies would thus be free from external constraints.
Many of the advocates of flexible rates were, of course, careful to
point out that flexible rates were not an instant cure for all external
adjustment problems. They recognized that, in particular, protracted imbal-
ances inherited from the fixed rate period could not be eliminated over-
night. More generally, they realized that trade flows would adjust to
exchange rate changes only after a certain lag. It was also appreciated
that, where underlying economic conditions were unstable, private capital
flows might be insufficient to prevent some exchange rate overshooting while
adjustments in the goods market were taking place. On the whole, however,
flexible rates were expected to prevent the recurrence of the protracted
external maladjustments experienced in the l96Os and early 1970s, and to
eliminate gradually the imbalances inherited from the past at little cost
in terms of exchange rate stability.
-
Toa large extent, these expectations have not been realized. To
begin with, the adjustment process in the goods market has not worked well.
In particular, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Switzerland have
maintained very strong current account positions despite the appreciation of—9—
their currencies both before and after the establishment of flexible rates.
The total current account surplus of these three countries increased from
about $8 billion in 1972 to $31 billion in 1978. On the other side, the
United States has kept experiencing recurring current account deficits
despite the marked effective depreciation of the U.S. dollar that took place
during that period. There is, of course, no reason to expect all industrial
countries to have the same balance of payments structure, since there may be
long—run differences among countries in propensities to save and in opportu-
nities for investment. What is required for payments equilibrium, however,
is that capital flows should also adjust to differing savings and invest-
ment propensities. It has been noted that existing financial conditions in
the major surplus countries, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, are
not well—suited for channeling savings abroad on a regular basis. (See
Kindleberger (1976) for the Federal Republic of Germany, and McKinnon (1978)
for Japan.) In the present case the fact that this pattern of current
account balances is not an equilibrium one is apparent from the pressures
on exchange markets that it generates. 1/
The difficulties with the adjustment process in the goods markets
are also apparent from the resurgence of trade restrictions (see Inter-
national Monetary Fund (1978)). The argument that flexible rates would
remove the balance of payments motive for restrictions on international
trade has clearly not been validated. Countries do not seem to be prepared
to accept Friedman's view that "if you have a flexible rate and you reduce
1/ Artus (1979) contains a detailed discussion of. this issue.— 10—
tariffs,movements in the exchange rate will automatically protect you
against having any adverse balance—of—payments effects, and therefore you
are not exporting or importing unemployment." (1969, p. 118.) Instead,
there has been a tendency toward protectionism on current transactions.
The persistence of the same pattern of current account imbalances
eight years after the currency realignment of 1971 and six years after the
widespread adoption of flexible rates cannot be blamed on any failure of
exchange rates to move. Over a number of years, rates have changed in the
right direction and by large amounts. It is of course easy to point out
that either the current balances or the private capital flows would have
had to adjust if the authorities had not intervened in the foreign exchange
markets. This, however, is begging the question. The authorities inter-
vened because current account imbalances were putting excessive strains on
exchange markets. It is these strains that must be explained.
A first source of strains is that economic developments in the 1970s
had the unfortunate effect of increasing existing current account imbalances
(see Artus (1979)). A marked reduction of the long—run rates of growth in
the three surplus countries, namely, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
and Switzerland, was accompanied by a fall in domestic investment relative
to saving.1/ At the same time, the main deficit country, the United States,
was faced by a gradual fall in its production of natural gas and crude
petroleum which led to a sharp increase in its dependence on imports of
energy. The position of U.S. manufacturers in their own domesticmarkets
1/ The current account surplus is by definition equal to domestic output
minus domestic absorption, or to domestic saving minus domestic investment.— 11—
wasalso eroded by the Continuous growth of Japanese exports and the emer-
gence of courtries such as Hong Kong, North Korea, The Republic of China,
and Singapore as major exporters.
These developments, however, do not explain fully the failure of
the adjustment process to work more effectively over the past few years.
Another reason seems to be that not enough consideration was given to the
requirements for a successful adjustment through exchange rate changes.
It has been known since the development of the absorption approach in the
late 1940s 1/ and the rediscovery of the monetary approach by Polak (1957),
Johnson (1957), and others, that current balances can be changed only if
domestic absorption is changed relative to output, and that changes in
exchange rates are not likely to have much lasting effect on this ratio
via relative—price effects or otherwise if the monetary authorities are
willing to validate any incipient price changes brought about by exchange
rate changes. In particular, if a country is running a large deficit on
its Current account and wishes to alter this situation, it will have to
cut its absorption through the use of a more restrictive monetary and
fiscal policy unless it has spare capacity available.
A restrictive policy alone, however, may contribute only to an exten-
ded period of unemployment and an extremely slow adjustment in the relative
prices between home goods and foreign goods 2/ because of the downward
1/ For a review of the development of the absorption approach, see
Rhomberg and Heller (1977).
2/ The argument presented here in terms of home goods and foreign goods
needs to be modified when the elasticity of substitution between internation—
ally tradable goods produced by the various countries is extremely high. In
such a case, the argument must be developed to some extent in terms of inter-
nationally tradable goods versus nontradable goods.— 12—
inflexibilityof goods and factor prices that may prevail in the short and
medium run. The advantage of an accompanying exchange rate devaluation is
that it changes relative prices directly. If the changes in relative prices
are sustained and the foreign trade price elasticities are significant, the
decrease in the real domestic demand for goods in general may be offset by
a switch in foreign and domestic demands toward domestic goods so that there
is no fall in the level of output.
-
Inbrief, flexible rates can play a useful role only if three inter-
dependent conditions are met: (1) there is a supporting demand—management
policy, (2) changes in the relative prices between home goods and foreign
goods are sustained, and (3) a shift in relative prices leads to a switch
in domestic and foreign demand between foreign goods and home goods.
The first condition for effective adjustment through exchange rates
was not often present during the past five years. Flexible rates did not
work better in part because demand—management policies were not usually
directed toward adjustment of current account imbalances. 1/ Cutting the
inflation rate, even at the cost of sluggish domestic aggregate demand, was
the major policy target in the surplus countries, while the United States
placed a higher priority on reducing unemployment in the short run. After
maintaining restrictive policies through 1974, the United States reversed
course in 1975—76 and allowed a sustained expansion of domestic demand to
develop accompanied by a rising inflation rate. The Federal Republic of
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, by contrast, relaxed their restrictive
1/ For a detailed analysis of the policy choices made by the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and
Sweden during 1972—75, see Black (1977).— 13—
policiesmore gradually. The shift toward a policy stance that was more
consistent with the longer—run need for external adjustment took place only
in the course of 1978, when the surplus countries expanded rapidly their
money supplies and the United States moved to a more restrictive monetary
policy. 1/
To some extent, domestic absorption may in fact have been left in
certain cases to respond perversely, via the investment effect, to the
change in the exchange rate. McKinnon (1978), in particular, has focused
attention on this aspect of the exchange rate mechanism. Countries with
a depreciating currency tend to experience an increase in the profitability
of producing internationally tradable goods, at least initially, because
prices in local currency increase more rapidly than the money wage rate.
This leads to an increase in investment, in domestic absorption, and in
imports. Opposite effects occur in countries with an appreciating currency.
These effects should subside in the long run if the money stock remains
unchanged, but, in the meantime, they delay the adjustment process. These
effects can, however, easily be exaggerated. There is no doubt that in
the surplus countries in the past few years the main causal nexus was,
with lags at each step, from restrictive domestic policies to sluggish
levels of economic activity, to large current account surpluses, and to
exchange rate appreciations, rather than in the opposite direction.
The lack of supporting demand—management policies was not the only
problem. A change in the price ratio between home goods and foreign goods
1/ It is worth noting that in the case of the three countries that
shifted to supporting demand—management policies in 1976, the external
adjustment worked relatively well during 1977—78. In France and Italy,
however, the imbalances were not really deep—rooted, and in the United
Kingdom North Sea oil played a major role.— 14—
thatpersists implies a sustained change in the real wage rate. In the
period of high inflation that has prevailed since the early 1970s, money
illusion and wage adjustment lags have been reduced and, with explicit and
implicit wage indexation clauses widespread in labor contracts, an adjust-
ment of real wages is difficult to bring about. Johnson (1969) and others
argued that, under a flexible exchange rate system, exchange rate adjustments
would occur gradually, and their impact on the cost of living might remain
unnoticed. 1/ The integration of the world economy has now proceeded so far,
however, that the residents of few, if any, countries have the illusion that
the local currency price of imported goods is not a major determinant of the
cost of living. In fact, they may be particularly sensitive to exchange rate—
induced domestic price changes. Exchange rate changes may thus fail to have
a lasting effect on the real wage rate even if the initial impact is to move
it back to its equilibrium level. Labor resistance, at least in the case of
a depreciation, may gradually move it back to its initial disequilibrium
position.
This "vicious circle" mechanism has been heavily focused upon by the
critics of flexible rates; see, for example, the Rapport des Economistes
Belges de Langue Francaise (1976). This effect should not, however, be
exaggerated. First, the lags involved in the adjustment of the money wage
rate to the consumer price index have not been eliminated. Second, and more
important, the adjustment of the money wage rates to the consumer price
1/ As indleberger humorously put it, it is only banana republics that
"get excepted by Johnson from flexible rates on the ground that "they do
not have the illusion that the price of bananas in local money is a major
determinant of the cost of living, as contrasted with the price of imported
goods." (Kindleberger, 1969, p. 5.)— 15—
indexis not beyond the power of the authorities to alter. This will be
discussed in Part II. What is striking, in fact, in Chart 1 is the size
and persistence of the effective changes in relative labor costs and goods
prices brought about by the exchange rate changes, at least as far as the
major industrial countries are concerned. 1/ 2/
A further disappointment as far as flexible rates and the adjustment
process is concerned has been the slow speed of adjustment to changes in
relative costs and prices in the goods markets. The extreme case is pro-
vided by Switzerland, where exports were still rising in 1978 in volume
terms despite the 30 to 50 per cent loss in cost and price competitiveness
experienced during the previous five years. Swiss exporters are highly
specialized and do not have in many cases the possibility of shifting their
production to the domestic market. 3/ Instead, they have shifted the com-
position of their export sales toward highly technical products and luxury
goods with low price elasticities. The adjustment is certainly easier in
larger and more diversified economies, but even in such cases it remains
1/ Not surprisingly, Chart 1 shows also that changes in relative export
prices tend to be smaller than changes in relative deflators of value
added which are themselves smaller than changes in relative unit labor
costs. Part of the lack of change in relative export prices is a purely
mechanical reflection of common cost elements (e.g., internationally traded
raw material inputs) in relative export prices, but it is certain that the
evidence also indicates that part of the exchange rate effect works through
changes in profit margins and supply incentives. Aggregate indices could
be misleading, but careful studies on specific types of manufactured goods
by Kravis and Lipsey (1977) and Kravis et. al. (1977) confirm these find-
ings.
2/ Wholesale prices for manufactures are proxied in Chart 1 by the
deflator of the GDP originating in manufacturing because of the poor
quality of a number of national indices for wholesale prices of manufac-
tures (e.g., the French, Belgian, and Italian indices), which put an
unduly low weight on finished products.
3/ The weakness of aggregate demand in the Swiss market has also pre-
vented any major shift from export markets to the domestic market.— toe —
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CHART 1
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES, RELATIVES COSTS AND PRICES, 1969-78
Effective exchange rate — Relative normalized unit Relative value added — — - Reletive export unit
labor costs in manufacturing deflators in manufacturing values of manufactures
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80— 16—
alengthy process. It is very common to point out that, in order to become
established or to expand in a new market, it is important to develop a dis-
tribution network, parts and service suppliers, and a reputation for reli-
ability and quality. During the 1960s German, Japanese, and Swiss manufac-
turers supplied high quality goods at very competitive prices, and developed
entrenched market positions in a number of products. In the process, these
countries became strongly export oriented. Such a process cannot be reversed
rapidly.
This is not to say that foreign trade flows do not respond in time
to variations in relative prices. General economic reasoning and the his-
torical evidence is convincing on this point, and the bulk of the econo-
metric results point in the same direction. 1/ Stern et al. (1976), after
reviewing more than 130 studies on price elasticities in international
trade, conclude that "typical" long—run demand elasticities vary between
—0.50 and —1.50 for total imports and —0.50 and —2.00 for total exports.
The studies reviewed are based on data on the 1950s and 1960s. The esti-
mates may be somewhat too high for the 1970s if, as McKinnon (1978) argues,
a floating rate regime increases exchange rate uncertainties and weakens
the incentives of traders to respond to cost and price differentials among
countries. Estimates based on more recent studies tend to show, however,
that while the long—run price elasticities may be smaller now, they remain
substantial. Estimates from the IMFWorldTrade Model that are derived
1/ It ought not be necessary for the economics profession to repeat the
unfortunate experience of the early postwar period, when the notion of a
dollar shortage was developed despite the difficulty of reconciling such a
result with economic theory and economic history. "Prices don't mattert'
is a proposition on about the same plane as "money doesn't matter."I..
— 17—
fromdata that cover the period throiigh 1977, for example, suggest a range
of —0.50 to —1.00 for total imports and —0.50 to —1.50 for total exports
(see Table 1).
Econometric estimates of the time lags involved in price effects
range widely in the literature from no lag to a mean lag of three or four
years. The most persuasive studies tend to find a mean lag of a couple of
years; see, for example, Beenstock and Minford (1977). Over the first few
quarters, the volume effects of an unanticipated change in the exchange
rate is bound to be small, if only because of the long lags between orders
and deliveries. In the IMF World Trade Model, for example, the sum of the
elasticities of demand for imports and exports is smaller than unity for
nine of the fourteen industrial countries over the first year and a half
(see Table 1). With the perverse effects of an exchange rate change on
the terms of trade that prevail over that period (Spitaeller (1979)), the
result is the well—known "J" curve effect. Initially, the trade balance
worsens with an exchange rate depreciation and improves with an appreci-
ation. This kind of lag no doubt explains why countries are often tempted
to use more direct tools such as trade controls despite their welfare
costs.
C.Flexible Rates and Stable Growth
Another major argument for flexible rates was that they would make it
possible for national authorities to achieve more stable rates of economic
growth. The argument was based on three propositions: (1) flexible rates
insulate a country's level of economic activity from foreign expansion

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































authoritiesover the money supply and allow them to use both monetary and
fiscal policy to influence the level of economic activity without cons-
traint from the external balance; and (3) the efficacy of monetary policy
is greatly enhanced by flexible rates, i.e., the effect of a given change
in the money supply on the level of economic activity is larger under flex-
ible rates.
The events of recent years suggest that a.ll three of these proposi-
tions are questionable. The degree of economic interdependence seems to
have been, if anything, greater since 1973 than before, in particular among
European countries, whether in the ttsnakefl or not. Similarly, there has
been no sign either of greater economic stability brought about by an
increase in the control of the authorities over the money supply, or much
evidence of an increase in the efficacy of such policies.
The conclusion of greater insulation from variations in economic acti-
vity abroad under flexible rates is based on two assumptions: (1) a real
external disturbance leads to an exchange rate change; and (2) the exchange
rate change prevents the external disturbance from having an effect on the
domestic economy. 1/ The effect of a fall in foreign demand, for example,
is seen to lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate rather than to a
deterioration of the trade balance that would have a deflationary effect
1/ The insulation issue is discussed here to a large extent from a single—
country rather than a global point of view. Taking into account the likeli-
hood that disturbances of various kinds may tend to affect the various coun-
tries at the same time leads to extremely complicated theoretical models
which do not add much to the understanding of the basic issues involved,
since there is no reason to assume stable patterns of covariances among
these disturbances.— 20—
onthe domestic economy. These two assumptions, however, seem to be valid
only to a limited extent.
Whether an external disturbance leads to an exchange rate change will
depend in part on whether the disturbance is viewed as being temporary. In
the case of a temporary disturbance, capital flows may have a stabilizing
influence on the exchange rate as market participants maintain their views
on the longer—term equilibrium value of the exchange rate. When the back-
ground is stable and there is a belief in a "normal" exchange rate, as dur-
ing much of the period in which the Canadian dollar floated in the 1950s,
offsetting effects of this kind have been found. Indeed, it is possible to
envisage capital flows playing an even more active role. If the fall in
foreign demand results from a recession abroad accompanied by a decrease
in the rate of return on investment, capital may tend to move to the home
country where the level of economic activity is sustained and the interest
rates are higher. Modigliani and Askari (1973) argue that this factor may
more than offset the effect of the worsening of the trade balance so that
the exchange rate appreciates rather than depreciates. 1/ In this case,
flexible rates would increase the impact of foreign disturbances on domestic
economic activity.
In the discussion of the' external adjustment process, however, it was
noted that capital flows had not offset completely the effects of demand—
induced disturbances on the current account in recent years. As pointed
1/ This point had been raised earlier by Fleming (1962). Some empirical
evidence confirming that hypothesis for the specific case of Canada during
the 1950s can be found in Rhomberg (1964).—21—
out in that discussion, the key factor in the failure of the exchange rate
to provide insulation is the lag in the response of trade flows to changes
in relative prices.
All the major econometric models of world trade——including the Link
model presented in Ball (1973) and the IMF World Trade Model described in
Deppler and Ripley (1977)—--show conclusively that year—to—year changes in
the volume of imports and exports are dominated by variations in real aggre-
gate demand. During the first one or two years, offsetting effects that
may result from exchange—rate—induced variations in relative prices are
generally only a small fraction of the effects of demand changes. Even
over a longer period, e.g., three years, the effect of demand changes
remains large relative to the offsetting effects of exchange rate changes.
Some calculations of the magnitudes of the fall in exchange rates necessary
to offset increases in demand for 14 industrial countries based on the IMP
World Trade Model were included in the 1978 IMP Annual Report. The results
indicate that an increase of 1 per cent in manufacturing output maintained
for three years has a strong negative effect on the trade balance in all 14
countries, ranging from 1 1/2 to 3 1/3 per cent of 1977 trade flows. It
was estimated by comparison that in most cases exchange rate declines of
the order of 5 to 15 per cent would be necessary to produce the same trade
balance effects.
There are thus strong grounds for concluding that a flexible rate does
not provide an automatic mechanism that will insulate a country's level of— 22—
economicactivity from foreign expansion and contraction. 1/ 2/ If .a flex-
ible rate contributes to a more stable rate of growth, it would be because
it frees the authorities from any balance of payments constraint and allows
them to direct demand—management policies toward the achievement of domestic
stability, or because it increases the degree of control of the authorities
over the money supply and enhances the efficacy of demand—management
policies. 3/
That fle.xible rates allow the authorities to control the money supply
(or more precisely, the monetary base) was, until recently, considered a
truism; and indeed it is, if the flexible rate regime is one where the
monetary authorities never worry about exchange rate developments in forming
their monetary policy. It has become obvious in recent years, however, that
such a benign neglect policy may lead in many cases to exchange rate insta-
bility. Artus (1976) and Dornbusch (1977), among others, have focused
attention on the high elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to (unan-
ticipated) changes in the money supply. While there is some difficulty in
explaining this high elasticity (a further discussion of this issue is given
later), the evidence is clear that uncoordinated monetary policy changes
1/ It similarly follows that real disturbances originating at home will
tend to be transmitted abroad in large measure under flexiblerates, and
thus their effects on the home economy will be diffused.
2/ This conclusion is also verified by empirical studies (e.g., Ripley
(1979)) which seem to suggest that the international transmission of fluc-
tuations in economic activity is no less powerful under flexible rates than
under fixed rates.
3/ In recent years the insulation argument has been seen to depend more
and more on the ability of the authorities to use policy instruments for
reaching domestic targets without being constrained by the external balance
rather than as a purely automatic mechanism. See, for example, Tower and
Willett (1976).— 23—
amongcountries often tend to lead to large changes in exchange rates.
Even if the money supply is kept stable in the various countries, exchange
rate instability may be a problem because of the short—run instability of
the demand for money.
These considerations do not, of course, detract from the fact that
flexible rates allow the authorities to maintain, in the longer run, a
monetary growth that is consistent with their ability to keep a low infla-
tion rate. They do, however, indicate the consequences that can follow
from attempts to use monetary policy to affect the level of economic activ-
ity over the short run without regard to the effects on the exchange rate.
The argument that flexible rates enhance the efficacy of demand—
management policies, in particular monetary policies, has also turned out
to be somewhat deceptive. The argument is similar to the one presented for
insulation. It was derived from the observation that the change inmoney
supply is likely to be accompanied by a variation in the exchange rate that
would reinforce its effect. As discussed above, however, the response of
the volume of the foreign trade flows to a change in the exchange rate is
likely to be so small in the short run that the additional expansionary
effect would not be noticeable. A further weakness in the efficacyargu-
ment is that price increases caused by the exchange rate depreciation may
sharply reduce the expansionary effect of the increase in the money supply.
Monetary policies affect the level of economic activity only if prices in
the goods markets adjust slowly to a monetary change. By speedingup the
price adjustment, flexible rates reduce the efficacy of monetary policies. 1/
1/ It is mainly on the basis of this argument that many authors such as
Argy (1975) have concluded that monetary policy will tend to have stronger
price and weaker employment effects in the short run under flexible rates.— 24—
The,efficacy argument is also to some extent misleading. The magnitude
of the effect of a given policy change is important, but itis even more
important that the effect of that policy change be foreseeable. There is
not much reason to believe, unhappily, that flexible rates increase the
extent to which the authorities can reliably estimate thequantitative
effect of a certain discretionary change inmonetary policies. This effect
will depend to a large extent on the behavior of theexchange rate and the
magnitude and timing of the effects of exchange rate changes on prices and
on the level of economic activity in the short run. In thisarea, it is
particularly difficult to make reasonably accurate forecasts.
II. The Case Against Flexible Rates
If the advantages of flexible rates have fallen short ofthe expec-
tations of their advocates, it must also berecognized that their drawbacks
have been less damaging than was anticipatedby their detractors. The word
"drawbak" may not even be appropriate to characterizethe disasters that
some suggested would occur if flexible rates wereadopted. It was argued——
for example, by Roosa (1967)——that, asa practical matter, a system of
flexible rates was not workable. As heput it:
I have never met anyone who has attained thecompetence of a
seasoned trader who would be prepared to continue inthe business if,
by some sleight of hand, all parities were to be abandoned andthe
central banks were barred from entering the markets intheir own cur-
rencies. Many, and I include myself, wouldprobably want to withdraw
from trading activities even under the sort offlexible—rate system
in which the central banks were allowed arole, so long as there were
no parity guidelines to get us into the right ball park.(p. 52.)— 25—
Thesefears were rapidly discarded as experience was gained with the
new system. Three other traditional arguments against flexible rates have,
however, shown more staying power, but only in a milder form than initially
advanced. The first is that flexible rates are inherently unstable; the
second, that exchange rate uncertainties disrupt domestic and international
economic relations; and the third, that flexible rates promote faster
inflation.
A.Exchange Rate Instability
Advocates of flexible rates had suggested that exchange rates would
reflect "underlying economic conditions"; as long as these conditions were
stable, exchange rates would also be stable. The underlying economic con-
ditions in question were not precisely defined, but the impression was left
that exchange rates would move only to the extent necessary to offset
differential rates of inflation and to compensate for changes in real fac-
tors, such as tastes and production techniques, that usually take place
only gradually. These views, however, never seemed to prevail completely
over the argument that flexible rates would be unstable and would disrupt
domestic and international economic relations.
After six years of flexible rates, a good deal of evidence has accumu-
lated which indicated that flexible rates tend to be unstable in the common—
sense meaning of "moving up and down a lot" from day to day, month to month,
and year to year. Illustrations of that instability are given in Charts 2,
3, and 4. Chart 2 shows the noon rates between the U.S. dollar and the cur—
rencies of the major industrial countries and Switzerland, while Charts 3
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Muchof the exchange rate instability shown in these graphs reflects
the marked domestic and international instability of recent years, including
the breakup of the par value system, the oil price increase of 1973, high
and divergent inflation rates, and the worldwide recession followed by
recoveries at varying rates among industrial countries. This being granted,
there are also a number of developments that suggest that exchange markets
with flexible rates may be characterized by the kind of instability gener-
ally found in other markets that are strongly influenced by expectations.
The "cycles" in the U.S. dollar/deutsche mark rate in 1973—76 are the first
development that attracted attention in that context. Then came (1) the
sudden and extremely rapid depreciations of the lira, French franc, and
pound sterling in 1976, followed in 1977—78 by the recov&ry of these cur-
rencies, in particular the pound; (2) the appreciation, then sharp fall in
the Canadian dollar in 1976—78; and (3) the rapid depreciation of the U.S.
dollar against the deutsche mark, Swiss Franc, and yen in 1977—78, culmi-
nating in the October 1978 crisis. In all these cases, there seems to be
the same lack of parallelism in the short run between the exchange rate
change and the change in the underlying economic and financial conditions.1/
1/ The 26 and 34 per cent depreciations of the U.S. dollar against the
deutsche mark and yen, respectively, from end—June 1977 to end—October 1978,
in particular, were out of proportion with underlying developments at least
in terms of either rates of monetary growth or inflation rate differentials.
Money (Ml) GNP deflator
(Percentage change based on (Percentage change)
period_averages) __________________________
1975 1976 1977 1978 1975 1976 1977 1978
Germany 14.1 10.2 8.3 13.8 6.7 3.3 3.6 3.5
Japan 10.3 14.2 7.0 10.8 12.8 5.5 5.4 3.7
United States 4.5 5.1 7.2 8.3 9.6 5.2 5.9 7.2— 27—
Exchangerates were sticky for a certain period, then changed suddenly,
overshot, and finally moved back to some extent, a pattern that is alien
to the gradual adjustment expected by advocates of flexible rates.
In part, the stickiness of exchange rates reflected governmental
intervention. This is clear for the lira, French franc, and pound sterling,
where the authorities intervened in the foreign exchange market on a sig-
nificant scale during 1974—75. More generally, the authorities concerned,
with the exception of the U.S. authorities in 1977, did not encourage
exchange rate adjustments during periods where the nominal exchange rate
tended to be stable while the underlying economic and financial conditions
were changing. They tended rather to reinforce the inertia of private mar-
ket participants. In addition, however, reasons for the instability must be
found in the nature of the exchange rate determination process. Nordhaus
(1978) has argued that volatility is to be expected in an "auction market"
such as the exchange market under floating rate simply because there are
incessant surprises. As he puts it:
In those pure auction markets where prices are the main shock—
absorber, considerable price volatility is the result. These
conditions generally prevail in raw foods and commodities markets,
in markets for many financial instruments such as common stocks,
or when a regime of pure floating exchange rates exists. Such
volatility is an intrinsic feature of real—world auction markets——
markets in which there are incessant surprises due to weather,
changes in taste, inventions, political upheaval, inflation,
recession and boom, etc. (p. 7.) 1!
This auction market characteristic is important, but it certainly
does not account fully for the magnitude of the observed short—run exchange
1/ In the same testimony before the Sub—Committee on Foreign Economic
Policy, Nordhaus pointed out that the day—to—day variability of the Dow
Jones industrial average in the recent period had been almost 0.5 per
cent a day as compared with 0.1 and 0.2 for the nominal value of the U.S.
dollar as measured by a trade—weighted index.— 28—
ratemovements. Tounderstand why a large measure of instability may be
an inherent characteristic of flexible rates it is useful to review recent
developments in the analysis of exchange rate determination. The basis of
this analysis is that exchange rates among currencies are the relative
prices of these currencies and therefore sensitive to any change in the
supply of, or demand for, financial assets denominated in these currencies.
Indeed, at every point in time the exchange rate must be at such a level
that the amount of financial assets denominated in a particular currency
matches the amount that market participants desire to hold. This is not
tosaythat relative prices in the goods markets do not influence exchange
rates, but the adjustment process in the goods markets works so much more
slowly than in the financial asset markets that they play a somewhat second-
ary role in the short run. 1/ The important contribution of this approach
is that, by treating exchange rates as financial asset prices, itfocuses
attention on the strong influence of expectations. Thus it is not only the
amount of assets available today that influences asset prices but also the
amount expected to be available tomorrow. It is the instability of
these expectations that appears to be a major factor in short—run exchange
rate instability. 2./
1/Several variants of this "asset market" approach are presented in the
papers included in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics No. 2, 1976, and
discussed in Bilson (1979), Dornbusch and Krugman (1976), Schadler (1977),
and Isard (1978).
2/ Here also the word unstable is used in its conon—sense meaning of
moving up and down frequently, rather than in the sense of moving contin-
uously away from equilibrium once disturbed.— 29—
Itis easy to explain why the expectations of marketparticipants tend
to be unstable. Forecasting the future course ofmonetary and other manage-
ment policies in different countries relative to each other isnormally, at
best, a matter of guess work. Mussa (1976),among others, has pointed out
how tenuous the information that forms the base forsuch forecasts usually
is, and how any new piece of information, even if somewhatunreliable, may
lead to a substantial revision of exchange rateexpectations and a sharp
movement in the spot rate. 1/ The instability ofexpectations is increased
further if market participants have reason to believethat domestic price
changes related to exchange rate variations may lead toaccommodating changes
in the money supply. Furthermore, themoney supply is not the only element
that affects the exchange rate so that even if theauthorities gradually
stabilize expectations with respect tomonetary policies by respecting pre—
announced monetary policy targets, exchange rateexpectations would not
necessarily be stable.
All those elements are, of course, not new to thedebate. The new
element, however, is the realization that, once the authoritiesrefuse to
be limited to policies that will keep theexchange rate along a predeter-
mined time path or at a certain parity, marketparticipants will normally
be quite uncertain as to the future path of theexchange rate even when
underlying economic conditions are not markedly unstable.Thus, there
seems every likelihood that flexible rates will continue to showsome
1/ Countries may have monetary targets, but inpractice such targets are
not often respected for long and thus do not necessarily stabilizethe expec—
tations of market participants with respect to the future timepaths of money
supplies.— 30—
short—terminstability in response to the inherent instability of market
participants' expectations. Of course, the more unstable the underlying
economic conditions are, the more unstable expectations will be.
The instability of expectations is not the only factor leading to
exchange rate instability. Various institutional rigidities have also been
focused upon in the context of the asset market approach to explain exchange
rate instability. McKinnon (1976) has pointed out that there might be an
inadequate supply of private capital available for taking net positions in
either the forward or spot markets on the basis of long—term exchange
rate expectations. 1/ Thus, cyclical variations in the demand for foreign
exchange originating from trade or financial activities that may be sus-
tained for a number of years may lead to large exchange rate movements
because of a lack of investors with both the funds and the willingness to
take a longer—run open position. Branson (1976), Dornbusch (1976), and
Kouri (1976) have rather focused on the slow speed of adjustment in the
goods markets in cases of unexpected monetary policy changes to explain
exchange rate instability. While their models differ, they all embody the
hypothesis that asset markets are continuously in equilibrium while the
goods markets adjust only gradually. They show that under such conditions,
the immediate response of the exchange rate to a monetary policy change
overshoots the new longer—run equilibrium rate. 2/
1/ As Isard (1978) notes, the unwillingness of banks and multinational
corporations to take open positions on the basis of longer—run exchange
rate expectations is to some extent related to the imprecision of these
expectations.
2/ For a review of these various models, see Bilson (1979), Schadler
(1977), and Isard (1978).— 31—
This"monetarist" explanation of exchange rate movements shouldnot
obscure the fact that the inadequate current—balanceadjustment discussed
in Part I is also one of the causes of exchange rateinstability. 1/ The
first reason is that a current account surplus leads toan accumulation of
net foreign assets. This in turn may lead to anappreciating exchange rate
to the extent that a fall in the relative price offoreign assets is needed
as an incentive for domestic agents to increase the share of theseassets
in their portfolio. 2/ Probably more important,however, is the impact of
current balance developments on exchange rate expectations. Theemergence
of a current account surplus that is not related totemporary distubances
may, at times, be rightly interpreted as an indication that a rise in the
real exchange rate is required if a lasting adjustment isto take place. 3/
How much of a change in the nominal rate will benecessary to bring about
the needed adjustment is, however, the type ofquestion that cannot be
answered with any degree of certainty. Market participantswill, therefore,
continually reassess their views of the needed exchange rate change on the
basis of actual current balance developments withoutalways being able to
discount properly the effects of temporary divergences ineconomic cycles,
curve effects of exchange rate changes, etc.
1/ It is somewhat astonishing in this context thatmost of the recent
economic literature on exchange rate determinationcompletely discarded this
factor up to about 1978, at which time Dornbusch (1978)noted that: "The
current account has just made it back as a determinant ofexchange rates."
(p. 1.)
2/ Some empirical evidence for this effect has been foundby Artus (1976),
Branson et al. (1977), and Porter (1977).
3/ At other times, the surplus on current accountmay be the result of
factors that provide their own offset to the currentaccount surplus in the
form of capital flows.— 32—
Afurther possible source of instability in the present system is
related to the fact that several currencies are held by central banks as
part of their international reserves. Any major action to change the com-
position of these reserves could lead to sharp exchange rate movements and
disorderly market conditions. Because they are conscious of the possible
harmful effects of their actions on the value of their portfolio and on
the system as a whole, large reserve holders tend to avoid major portfolio
shifts. As result, they may maintain larger stocks of certain reserve cur-
rencies than they would choose to have, and the possibility that some of
these balances might come on the market creates uncertainty in the minds
of both private and official holders. The overhang of official sterling
balances seems to have played a destabilizing role through 1976. 1/ More
recently, there have been signs that actual or potential diversification
out of U.S. dollar reserve balances was a factor in the weak behavior of
the U.S. dollar in 1978.
The inherent instability of expectations, limitations on the role of
stabilizing capital movements, the slow speed of adjustment in the goods
markets, the persistence of current account imbalances, and the existence
of a multiple reserve currency system account for much of the volatility
in exchange market behavior in recent years. 2/ There are, moreover, cases
1/ In February 1977, a $3 billion medium—term stand—by credit facility
was extended to the Bank of England by a group of European central banks
and the central banks of Canada, Japan, and the United States. This
facility could only be drawn upon if U.K. official reserves stood at less
than the equivalent of $6,750 million, and it has not been used in the
succeeding two years.
2/ Other factors of volatility have also been mentioned. In particular,
Cirton and Roper (1976) have focused on the substitution between the
noninterest—bearing portions of different countries' money stock (cont'd)— 33—
inwhich extrapolative expectations or "bandwagon" behavior on the part
of market participants appears to have played a role. Dooley and Shaffer
(1976) have found some tentative evidence indicating that such effects
may occur, and it is hard to explain exchange market developments in October
1978 without reference to extrapolative expectations or bandwagon effects.
Outof22 market days in October, the U.S. dollar depreciated on 19 days
against the deutsche mark, with the other 3 days characterized by relatively
flat movements.
B.The Costs of Instability
While the evidence is building up to suggest that a floating rate
system is characterized by a good deal of what is commonly regarded as
exchange rate instability, it is not clear how important any detrimental
effects of this instability have been or will prove to be. With forward
rates of exchange seeming to contain little information on actual movements
2/ (cont'd from p. 32) that may occur when the expected rate of inflation,
and therefore the expected rate of return on fiat money, differs among coun-
tries. Such portfolio shifts do not necessarily take place gradually over
time and may be the cause of sudden exchange rate movements. Kareken and
Wallace (1978) have even advanced the view that the choice between different
fiat moneys is "of the all—or—nothing variety," so that in a floating rate
system without stringent capital controls there is simply no equilibrium
value for the exchange rate. There is little if any empirical support for
the view when put in this extreme form. As Haberler (1979) notes, the
uncertainty about future inflation rates and, of greater importance, the
legal provisions, the extra cost of transactions of using different money,
and the sheer inertia of the public, ensure the local dominance of national
money, except under conditions of hyperinflation. In fact, even in the case
of Germany in 1920—23, the substitution was slow. Under more normal circum-
stances, the substitution is quite limited as demonstrated by all available
historical evidence. (See Brillembourg and Schadler (1979) for an attempt
to use econometric techniques to estimate the substitution elasticities
among major currencies.) It is perhaps worth adding that if a country wishes
to discourage a flight from its noninterest—bearing money, it is possible to
arrange to pay interest, even on currency.— 34—
ofspot rates into the future (see Cornell (1977)), this instability is prob-
ably accompanied by an increase in uncertainty. It is difficult, however,
to assess the detrimental effects that may follow from the increase in
uncertainty. These detrimental effects 11couldinclude (1) a reduction
foreign trade, (2) a decline in foreign investment, and (3) the adverse
effects resulting from changes in the value of reserve currencies.
The risks of a dislocation of international economic relations was a
major theme of the critics of a flexible rate system in the l950s and l960s.
It was argued that exchange rate flexibility, by increasing the uncertainty
associated with international transactions, would discourage both foreign
trade and international investment.2! The additional uncertainty associated
with foreign trade could be related to the risk of exchange rate changes
during the period between contract and settlement, or to the risk of changes
in the relative cost and price competitiveness of countries because of
exchange rate changes. Supporters of flexible rates argued that forward
markets could be used to take care of the first type of risk, and that over
the longer run exchange rate changes would reflect changes in price and
cost competitiveness.
1/ For a previous discussion of a number of these detrimental effects,
see Artus and Crockett (1978).
2/ In The Treatise on Money, Keynes differentiated between the effects
of exchange rate fluctuations on foreign trade and foreign investment. On
the first he commented: "So far as foreign trade is concerned, I think
that the advantage of fixing the maximum fluctuations of the foreign
exchanges within quite narrow limits is usually much over—estimated. It is,
indeed, little more than a convenience." (p. 298) On international invest-
ment his view was different: "When we. come to foreign lending, however, the
advantages of a fixed exchange rate must ...beestimated much higher.In
this case the contracts between borrower and lender may cover a far longer
period than would be contemplated by any practicable dealings in forward
exchange." (p. 298.)— 35—
Theexperience of the last few years has indicated that some of the
difficulties likely to be encountered by those engaging in international
transactions were treated rather casually in the earlier debate. It might
appear that a businessman has eliminated exchange risk if he covers the
position with a forward transaction, but, if his competitor does not and is
thereby able to offer goods at a lower price, the forward transaction does
not eliminate all the consequences of a change in the spot rate. Further,
little was said about the difficulties firms would encounter in avoiding
major fluctuations in their profit figures, and the problems that would be
posed by their own internal accounting arrangements or externally applied
accounting standards.
While life may have become more complicated for those engaged in
international transactions, this does not necessarily mean that there has
been a significant effect on foreign trade or investment. Indeed, to
date, the statistical evidence tends to be negative. Hooper and Kohihagen
(1976) introduced various proxies for exchange rate uncertainty (vari-
ability) in import and export volume equations for the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany for 1965—75, and found they did not play
any significant role. Various tests making use of the IMF World Trade
Model (see Deppler and Ripley (1978) for the description of the model) have
also failed to detect any systematic effects of exchange rate uncertainty on
disaggregated trade flows for individual industrial countries through 1977.
The evaluation of the trade pattern of the snake countries is also
interesting in this context. While the proportion of intra—snake manufac—
turing trade to non—snake trade expanded in the late 1960s and early 1970s,—36—
it contracted slightly between 1972 and 1977 despite the increased stabil-
ity of intra—snake exchange rates relative to exchange rates with non—
snake countries during that period. 1/ Such tests are not precise enough
to reject the hypothesis that exchange rate instability has had harmful
effects on foreign trade flows. But even taking into account the limita—
tions of the data and the fact that there are likely to be long lags in the
response of trade to exchange rate instability, these tests do raise doubts
that major effects have been present.
Exchange rate instability did not have more of an effect on interna-
tional trade in part because facilities for hedging have normally remained
adequate. It is only in a few instances, such as the case of the lira in
early 1976, that forward markets have dried up because of excessive uncer-
tainty. 2/ The costs of hedging in such markets as measured by the bid—ask
spreads have increased with the move to flexible rates, but they still-
represent only a minute fraction (usually about one tenth of a per cent or
less) of the value of a currency. Forward contracts for aslong as a year
are not unusual, and, at a price, a trader can always cover by borrowing
in one market and lending in the other. In many cases, multinational cor-
porations can hedge internally by matching the timing of their futur.e
receipts and disbursements in particular currencies. It remains difficult,
1/ The snake countries considered here are Belgium—Luxembourg, Denmark,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway.
2/ Forward markets do not exist for the currencies of a number of devel-
oping countries. Normally these currencies are, however, pegged on a major
currency and the forward market for that currency can be used for hedging
purposes. Those currencies that are pegged to a basket can achieve partial
hedging by operating in the forward market for a major currency.— 37—
however,to hedge against the risk that exchange rate movements that are
sustained for, say, two to three years may temporarily change relative
costs and prices in the goods markets.
It is even more difficult to assess the effects of exchange rate insta-
bility on the long—term investment flows which cannot be easily covered in
forward markets or through other hedging mechanisms. So far little evidence
has accumulated that financial and nonfinancial enterprises have signifi-
cantly curtailed international capital movements in response to exchange
rate fluctuations. To the extent that it is expected that changes in rela-
tive price levels and shifts in exchange rates will tend to be offsetting,
some built—in safeguards are present, and the other major determinants of
investment flows then tend to dominate decisions. These include, in the
case of foreign direct investment, positive advantages in terms of direct
access to material inputs, skilled labor, markets, etc. It is worth empha-
sizing, however, that even if exchange rates adjust to relative price and
cost levels over the long run, instability in exchange rates and selective
prices in 'the short run can have detrimental effects because in planning
their investment strategy firms must put a relatively high weight on expec-
ted rates of return in the early years of a project. These rates of return
are uncertain in situations of exchange rate instability.
Exchange rate instability involving a major reserve currency raises
particular problems. For example, developments with respect to the U.S.
dollar in 1978 had major repercussions throughout the system, as virtually
every country found some of its important bilateral rates changing signifi-
cantly. Moreover, with the bulk of official reserves held in the form— 38-
ofU.S. dollar balances, this meant major changes in the value of inter-
national reserves, and put pressure on reserve holders to consider diver-
sifying their portfolios. The precipitous decline in the dollar relative
to the deutsche mark and the yen generated a very pronounced reaction
against the floating system. It may turn out retrospectively that this
was a structural change that needed to take place and would have been diffi—
cult in the extreme to bring about without the contribution made by the
relatively free play of market forces. The immediate effect, however, was
to add to the disillusionment with the floating rate system.
These brief comments on the costs of exchange rate instability have
touched upon the conventional quantifiable costs. While there are clearly
some grounds for the kind of irritation that seems to have developed about
the operation of the flexible rate system, the extent of the reaction is
somewhat surprising. 1/ Why is it that it is rare these days to hear
vigorous criticism of fluctuations in other financial markets, such as the
equity or bond markets, and such strong feelings about exchange rate fluc-
tuations? Complacency about stock market fluctuations was not always the
general rule. Keynes' comments in the General Theory are well—known:
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enter-
prise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital develop-
ment of a country becomes a by—product of the activities of a
casino, the job is likely to be ill—done. The measure of success
attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the
proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most
1/ Surveys of U.S. entrepreneurs are reviewed in Burtle and Mooney
(1978). For a survey of U.K. entrepreneurs, see Oppenheimer (1978). U.K.
businessmen seem to react more negatively than their U.S. counterparts
to exchange rate instability.— 39—
profitablechannels in terms of future yield, cannot be claimed as
one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez—faire capitalism——which
is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains
of Wall Street have been in fact directed towards a different
object. 1/ (p. 159)
There is little echo of this view in current discussions of equity markets,
but clearly a good deal of this kind of sentiment in discussions of exchange
markets. There are, no doubt, many reasons for this, the most obvious being
that any "cure" for equity market instability may be either impossible to
find or worse than the disease. Decades of experience under the gold
standard and under par values do not, however, suggest that stability in
exchange rates Is either impossible or necessarily hazardous to the effec-
tive operation of economies. Moreover, the ordinary public can escape
direct involvement in equity markets, even if some of their resources are
committed to these markets by their pension funds or insurance companies.
The exchange rate, however, has very broad effects on all who produce or
consume goods and services that are traded internationally. Thus, the
statement that no government can be indifferent to the exchange rate is
as much a political as an economic observation.
C.Flexible Rates and Inflation
Few characteristics of modern society have failed to be identified as
a cause of inflation, and flexible rates are no exception. The fact that
the present inflation originated and developed under pegged rates at least
1/ It is interesting that one of Keynes' proposals for dealing with this
problem, namely a "substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions"
to discourage the "predominance of speculation over enterprise" in the stock
market, has recently been repeated by James Tobin for exchange market trans-
actions in his forthcoming paper in the Eastern Economic Journal "A Proposal
for International Monetary Reform."— 40—
limitsthe extent to which flexible rates can be identified as a possible
culprit. Even among those, however, who have no doubt that persistent
increases in prices in terms of any particular currency cannot occur unless
the authorities responsible for that currency follow accommodating policies,
there are some who argue that there are inflationary risks associated with
flexible rates. These arguments are all variants of the notion that it is
harder to maintain the discipline of prudent monetary ana fiscal policies
under flexible rates than under fixed rates.
It has often been suggested, for example, that changes in exchange
rates can exercise asymmetrical effects. It is argued 1/ that nominal
prices in goods markets are inflexible downward, so that initially the
increase in the domestic prices of goods tends to be larger in depreciating
countries than the decrease in their prices in appreciating countries.
Whether this is so is arguable, 2/ but in any case a permanent effect on
the overall price levels in the two countries is not to be expected as long
as no change is made in their demand—management policies. Thus, the argu-
ment has to be pushed one step further.
The second level of the argument is that the money wage rate is inflex-
ible downward. 3/ Thus, a fall in the domestic prices of traded goods leads
1/ A recent version of this position is attributed to Laffer and Mundell
by Wanniski (1974).
2/ For a discussion of the empirical evidence on this point, see Crockett
and Goldstein (1976).
3/ It has been pointed out that given prevailing inflationary conditions,
the inflexibility problem is not relevant since there is sufficient room for
rates of change of prices and money wages to be reduced because of exchange
rate movements without ever becoming negative (see, for example, Claasen
(1976)). This point is not crucial, however, since the downward inflexi—
bility may apply to some extent to the rate of change of the money wage rate
as well as to its level.— 41—
toa fall in profit margins and in the level of economicactivity in the
appreciating country, while in the depreciatingcountry a rise in wages in
response to the depreciation reduces any increase in profitmargins or in
the level of economic activity. There is thusa fall in the aggregate level
of economic activity for the two countriestaken together. Under such con-
ditions, the monetary and fiscal authoritiesmay take expansionary action,
ad exchange rate variations could thus lead tomore expansionary policies
and thus to a higher rate of inflation for -theworld as a whole.
A criticism of the Laffer—Mundell line ofargument has been raised by
Crockett and Goldstein (1976). This criticism isthat the exchange rate
instability under discussion is to a large extent shortrun in nature.
Given the slowness of the effects of exchangerate changes on activity
levels and resource allocation in the goodsmarkets, it is unlikely that
short—run exchange rate movements haveany noticeable effects on these
variables and unemployment. There is, therefore,no reason to suppose
that the authorities will adopt moreexpansionary policies in response to
week—to—week or month—to—month fluctuations. Thisgeneral point is valid,
but there are also cases of longer—runexchange rate instability.
It has also been argued that undue relianceon the exchange rate to
correct certain external and domestic imbalancescan push a country into
a vicious circle of depreciation and inflation. Typicalcases are those
where labor unions succeed in obtaining an increase inthe money wage rate
that exceeds the increase in the marginal valueproduct of labor, or where
an exogenous shock, such as the oil price increase of 1973, l-eadsto a— 42—
deteriorationin the terms of trade. If real wage rates are inflexible
downward and demand—management policies are accommodating, then currency
depreciation can lead to price increases owing to the presence of imported
goods in the price index, and this in turn leads to higher increases in
wages that lead to higher prices, more depreciation, and a further feed—
back to prices, wages, and the exchange rate.
Asymmetrical price and wage effects and vicious circles would have
very limited effects on inflation if the authorities did not accommodate
incipient domestic costs and price increases by following expansionary
monetary policies. Thus it is demand—management policies rather than flex-
ible rates that are the fundamental factor, and the case for a positive
association of flexible rates and inflation rests on the view that there
may be occasions in which the authorities feel constrained to accommodate
incipient domestic cost and price increases rather than accept temporary
unemployment. Against this must be counterbalanced the greater freedom
stable countries have had to pursue prudent policies, and thereby to enjoy
a virtuous circle of currency appreciation and falling rates of price
increase. It should also be noted that depreciating rates have not freed
governments from pressures to take strong action to check adverse developments.
Indeed, rapid depreciation is widely regarded as clear evidence of impru-
dent policies, and the fact that an underlying disequilibrium is not
maskedby a fixed rate and restrictions on the flow of goods and capital
has in a number of cases played a positive role in bringing about adjust-
ment.— 43—
III.The Search for Greater Exchange Rate Stability
While it is too early to draw any final conclusions, there is no doubt
that there has been disillusionment with the floating rate system.
It is true that floating rates have cleared exchange markets without tradi-
tional balance of payments "crises," and that flexibility has made it easier
for rates of inflation to differ from country to country. These are, how-
ever, mixed blessings if the rates at which exchange markets clear fluctuate
widely and if, as is increasingly recognized, the freedom to inflate is a
form of license which, if exercised, brings more costs than benefits. A
country can avoid importing inflation, but even in that respect the system
is not without its dangers if the exchange rate appreciation goes to the
point, as in the case of Switzerland in 1978, of threatening industrial
effects which might prove to be excessive over the long run. Finally, given
the lags in the response of goods markets to exchange rate changes and other
factors, external adjustment problems have persisted and the ability of
national authorities to stabilize growth rates has turned out to be about
as limited under flexible rates as it was under the par value system.
It is true that the more extreme fears on which the case against
flexible rates was built have not proved to be justified. Foreign exchange
markets have adapted to the flexible rate environment, and so far there is
little evidence that the flows of foreign trade or international capital
movements have been significantly curtailed in response to exchange rate
fluctuations. The marked short—run variability of rates has, nevertheless,
generated hostility toward the flexible rate system.— 44—
Thishostility might well have been contained if the exchange rate
instability had been limited to the first two or three years of floating
and if, as seemed possible in 1975 and 1976, the system had tended to settle
down. The events of 1977—79, however, have rekindled the fears that irista—
bility may be an inherent characteristic of the floating system. Thus, as
a result of both experience and analysis, it is less clear now than it
appeared a few years ago that if the major industrial countries were to
succeed in achieving orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability,
this would automatically bring exchange rate stability. In short, it now
appears that national stability is a necessary, but probably not a suffi-
cient, condition for exchange rate stability. This has contributed to
skepticism among policymakers on the benefits of a floating rate system
and encouraged support for greater fixity. The renewed attempt to develop
a European Monetary System is one example of this search for stability.
A.The Continuing Need for Exchange Rate Flexibility
While there is a strong and widespread desire for greater stability
of exchange rates, there is no escaping the fact that this implies a sub-
stantial measure of domestic economic stability, and such stability is not
going to be easy to achieve over a wide range of countries. It might be
thought that the widespread view that there is no significant trade—off between
inflation and unemployment over the long run would make it easy to muster
support for policies that could bring economies down from a high rate of
inflation to a significantly lower one. But just as the knowledge that
freer trade increases welfare does not eliminate the short—run adverse
effects arising from the reduction of trade barriers, and therefore does— 45—
notremove opposition to tariff cutting, so the fact that there are serious
transitional difficulties in bringing down rates ofwage and prices increase
has been a major inhibiting factor in achieving national stability.
Part of the difficulty arises from the nature of labor markets where,
even in the absence of formal union contracts, there is a long—term
relationship between employers and employees which is of a contractual
character. 1/ Without a strong anti—inflationconsensus, it is difficult
to convince employers and their employees that an announced intention to
curb expenditure and reduce inflation really means that the economic
climate has changed, and that major adjustments in price expectations and
wage demands should be made. If those setting wages and salaries are not
convinced, wage settlements, whether unionized or non—unionized, will not
decline rapidly enough to prevent a sharp rise in unemployment. The rise
in unemployment brings strong pressure to bear on governments to reverse
its restrictive policies, and if this happens it becomes increasingly
difficult to mount a convincing anti—inflation program on a later occasion.
A number of countries have drifted into this kind of vicious circle
and found it difficult in the extreme to extricate themselves. Other coun-
tries have been fortunate in having or developing public attitudes on
1/ Hicks (1932) drew attention to the special nature of labor markets
in his early work on wage theory. Gordon (1974) provided a neoclassical
explanation of the tendency of short—run adjustments to a fall in demand
to come in the form of employment declines rather than wage changes and a
more rudimentary presentation of the argument can be found in the 1972
Fund Report of the Canadian Prices and Incomes Commission (for which
Gordon was a consultant). A number of others, including Baily (1974),
Azariadis (1976), Barro (1977) and Fischer (1977) have discussed the con-
sequences that follow from the contractual nature of transactions in labor
markets.— 46—
inflationwhich have led to much more decisive results. In countries where
it is generally agreed that inflation is a serious threat, then, if the gov-
ernment announces restraining action, the public is ready to believe that
in fact money expenditure will be controlled and that it would be foolish
not to adjust. The adjustment of employers and employees which then follows
helps to prevent unemployment from rising to politically dangerous levels.
There is therefore little pressure for a reversal of policy and this rein-
forces the anti—inflation program. The same countries that have benefited
from public hostility to inflation have also had other advantages in achiev-
ing reasonable price stability with limited effects in terms of unemployment
for their own nationals. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzer-
land adjusted-to a lower level of economic activity, in part by decreasing
the number of foreign workers employed in their economies. In the case of
Japan, the employment policies of firms are such that the number of firings
have been limited. Thus, those that have the ability to control inflation
have also been able to pass along some of the social costs to others, or
have had social arrangements that limited the political risks of economic
slack.
It is not to be expected that differences in rates of inflation
among countries will be eliminated in the near future. The more stable
countries will understandably be reluctant to follow policies that will
lead to a return to significant rates of price increase. At the same time,
a number of inflating countries have great difficulty in persevering with
policies that would reduce their rates of inflation substantially over
the next few years. Some believe that pegged rates in and of themselves— 47—
wouldlead to the necessary conversion to a belief in reasonable price
stability in the latter countries. While there are somefeedbacks from
exchange rates to domestic decisions on inflation, in aworld which is
as far away as this one from belief in the verities ofthe gold standard
or the sanctity of a particular exchange rate, it is unlikelythat there
will be a strong response to such a simple appeal. Thus, the need for a
considerable measure of exchange rate flexibility is likely to remain for
some years to come.
Problems of Pegged Rate Systems
The justification for some form of pegging, or its approximation in
the form of heavily managed floating, that would allow for the needed
exchange rate flexibility while avoiding any undue variability is clear in
principle. Given existing domestic and foreign circumstances and policies,
there are adjustment paths for exchange rates that would minimize the
adjustment costs of economies. Market forces may lead to different, more
erratic adjustment paths. If the authorities had the objective of mini-
mizing adjustment costs, and if they could discount temporary disturbances
better than private market participants, "they could steer rates more
directly to their longer—run equilibrium levels. However, what if, as it
appears likely, neither market participants nor the authorities have any
precise view of what the longer—term equilibrium exchange rates are? Given
that uncertainty, the authorities' stabilizing role does not derive from
knowledge that is denied to market participants, but rather from the fact
that the amount of resources available to them enable them to set the price,
if that price is a reasonable one.— 48—
Aslong as the rates set by the authorities are withinthe band consti-
tuted by what private market participants viewas realistic exchange rates,
then setting rates is simply away of getting short—run expectations to
coalesce on specific, if somewhat arbitrary, values.Smoothing out adjust-
ment paths may, therefore, have little to do withhaving deeper insight than
that of private market participants; itmay simply call for a commitment on
the part of the authorities to set and maintainreasonable exchange rates.
That a pegged rate system can be successful interms of reducin
short—run exchange rate instability has been demonstratedby the relative
success of the snake arrangement for those that remained withinit. There
are, however, major risks in any governmental policy to control theexchange
rate. The main risk arises from the tendency of the authoritiesto maintain
excessive rate rigidity. It is not that the authorities willnecessarily
be unaware of the need for a rate change,although this is a problem, but
rather that they often cannot resist the temptationto maintain an over-
valued rate as a form of price control, or an undervaluedrate as a form
of production incentive. They may resist depreciationbecause such an
event is viewed by the public, often rightly, as asign that the authorities
have followed inflationary policies. Theymay also resist an appreciation
because it would be unpopular with those inexport and import—competing
industries. A formal pegged system, as opposed toa heavily managed float,
seems particularly subject to this danger of excessive raterigidity, since
changes in pegged rates are more noticeable, and morepolitically difficult
to make, than a gradual change in the interventionpoints under a managed
float.— 49—
Successfulresistance to exchange rate change on one occasion encourages
further resistance later, and the exchange system soon becomes increasingly
fixed. If, however, the conditions for fixity are not met, the ultimate
result is an exchange rate crisis followed by a major exchange rate movement.
Private market participants soon lose any confidence they may have had in
the ability of the authorities to set a rate that is realistic, and there
may even be a presumption that, if a rate is set by the authorities, it is
probably wrong.
It is this natural tendency of the authorities to resist market pres-
sures even when they reflect changes in the underlying economic and finan-
cial conditions that led to the break up of the Bretton Woods system in
the early l970s, and, as Oort (1974), the former Dutch Treasurer—General,
and others have noted, there is no indication so far that this tendency
has disappeared. In fact, as noted in previous sections, while it is
certainly true that floating rates have tended to be unstable, part of the
instability experienced in exchange markets in recent years can be directly
attributed to vain attempts by the authorities to maintain exchange rate
rigidity in the face of changing underlying economic and financial condi-
tions.
Even if this inherent bias toward fixity could be avoided, a pegged
system remains difficult to manage. If there are disparities in policies
and performance, changes in pegged rates have to be quite frequent. Those
operating in exchange markets are therefore likely to be confronted every
year, if not every few months, with situations in which rates are likely
to change, and there is little doubt as to the direction such changes will— 50—
take.This leads to protective steps by those with foreign exchange
exposure, and they may be joined by others looking for a speculative gain.
This problem can be avoided only by making more frequent changes in the peg
which can therefore be so small that they are not worth anticipating. Under
these circumstances, a pegged rate system tends to be transformed either
into a gliding rate system or back into a floating rate system.
A number of countries, of course, do at present peg their currencies
to a single currency or a basket of currencies, and do so with underlying
conditions that lead to periodic devaluations. These are generally coun-
tries, however, with relatively undeveloped financial markets. It is not
clear that pegged rates among major industrial countries could be subject
to frequent variations by significant amounts without leading to exchange
markets that were even more nervous and volatile than they are under managed
floating. This may well set limits to what might be called "premature
pegging."
It might appear that a gliding rate system would be the solution
because it would reduce the risks of inappropriate rates by taking into
account automatically some of the changes in underlying economic and finan-
cial conditions. The differences with a pegged rate system, however, are
more a matter of degree than of kind. The difficulty in a gliding peg
system lies in the choice of the formula. Since there are no simple objec-
tive indicators that can be relied upon to reflect the changing underlying
conditions, exchange market disequilibria can build up under a gliding rate
system nearly as fast as under a pegged system. For example, an attempt
to fix the rate between the yen and the U.S. dollar since the early l970s— 51—
onthe basis of some indicators of relative domestic prices of manufactures
or relative unit labor costs in manufacturing would have been disastrous.
Domestic prices and unit labor costs tended to rise faster in Japan than
in the United States during that period so that the value of the yen in
terms of U.S. dollars would have been gliding downward on the basis of
such indicators. More sophisticated indicators can be designed (see Artus
(1978) and Kenen (1975)), but ultimately there is always the same need for
discrete changes in the rate at not infrequent intervals.
Flexibility is not the only condition required for the achievement
of greater exchange rate stability. As pointed out in Part II, monetary
and financial factors play an important role in the short—run determina-
tion of the exchange rate, and if greater exchange rate stability is to be
achieved, careful attention must be given by the authorities to exchange
market developments in reaching decisions on monetary policy.
Over the years, monetary authorities have adopted various indicators
as a guide for their actions. Under the international gold standard, the
maintenance of that standard was the prime objective of policy, and the
international position was crucial in determining the discretionary actions
of central banks. Under looser international arrangements, central banks
felt they had greater, though limited, freedom to focus on the credit con-
ditions, or more narrowly on the interest rates, that would contribute to— 52—
domesticobjectives. These indicators had their weaknesses, and were par-
ticularly open to misinterpretation during periods of inflation. More
recently the emphasis has been on monetary quantities, with a number of
major industrial countries establishing targets for various monetary magni-
tudes. While adherence to monetary targets has proved to be difficult,
an approach of this kind has seemed helpful in moving in the direction of
greater stability. Experience and analysis suggest, however, that if
greater stability of exchange rates is to be achieved, whether under managed
floating or some form of pegging, the authorities will need to pay closer
attention to international considerations in making short—run decisions on
demand—management policies. Indeed, the exchange rate may often perform
as a better indicator for monetary policy than interest rates or monetary
aggregates, in particular in periods where the demand for money is unstable
and the monetary aggregates subject to statistical problems. There is some
evidence that in the recent period national authorities have moved in that
direction and have been giving greater thought to exchange market develop-
ments in determining monetary policy.— 53—
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